What can sensorimotor enactivism learn from studies on phenomenal adaptation in atypical perceptual conditions? : A commentary on Rick Grush and colleagues

Grush et al. present a pilot study on visual adaptation to a remapped color spectrum. Their preliminary results, being far from conclusive, only partially support the hypothesis that there might exist a form of adaptation to color rotation and color constancy. Proving such flexibility in color vision would substantiate the investigators’ attempt to localize their research outcomes in the context of philosophical theories of enactive perception. In spite of some limitations, the study exhibits a worthy and novel approach to the old question of color inverted experience, intended to provide an interdisciplinary account that is both empirically sensitive and philosophically potent. For the progress of the current investigation it would be constructive not only to conduct empirical follow-up studies, but also to conceptually refine the notion of “phenomenal adaptation”, which is the central phenomenon studied here. based upon a distinction between phenomenal conservatism that accepts only perceptual phenomenology with sensory contents and phenomenal liberalism that acknowledges higher-level contents of perception and cognitive phenomenology, i differentiate between adaptation of the sensory sort and adaptation in the cognitive aspects of experience. this distinction is used to highlight two different ways of understanding the notion of “phenomenal adaptation”, exhibited by the target article and this commentary. grush et al. seem to suggest that phenomenal and (non-phenomenal) semantic adaptation are different forms of a more general phenomenon of adaptation. however, they do not give any explicit example of the genus of adaptation of which these types are a species. i contend, in turn, that there is no need to produce such subclasses of the notion; semantic adaptation involving higher-level non-sensory states may also be understood as phenomenal. this follows from phenomenal liberalism. i argue that what is being processed in the course of phenomenal adaptation is phenomenal character understood in an expansive way that includes high-level contents. the claim may have an important effect on related empirical work. as a result, enactive sensorimotor adaptation does not have to be seen as adaptation of the sensory sort, but as adaptation in the cognitive aspects of experience, such as altered expectations, or beliefs about or sensitivity to kinds of objects encountered in perceptual experience. this phenomenally liberal reading would provide an appropriately more capacious notion than the adaptation of the sort offered by grush et al. finally, i claim that the lessons for enactive theories of color perception may be expanded beyond the implications of the color rotation study. this is demonstrated by turning to confirmatory and challenging cases of atypical perceptual conditions and color modifications, such as synesthetic color experiences

The sun is no fun without rain : Physical environments affect how we feel about yellow across 55 countries

Across cultures, people associate colours with emotions. Here, we test the hypothesis that one driver of this cross-modal correspondence is the physical environment we live in. We focus on a prime example – the association of yellow with joy, – which conceivably arises because yellow is reminiscent of life-sustaining sunshine and pleasant weather. If so, this association should be especially strong in countries where sunny weather is a rare occurrence. We analysed yellow-joy associations of 6625 participants from 55 countries to investigate how yellow-joy associations varied geographically, climatologically, and seasonally. We assessed the distance to the equator, sunshine, precipitation, and daytime hours. Consistent with our hypotheses, participants who live further away from the equator and in rainier countries are more likely to associate yellow with joy. We did not find associations with seasonal variations. Our findings support a role for the physical environment in shaping the affective meaning of colour.Peer reviewe

Psychophysiological evidence for the genuineness of swimming-style colour synaesthesia

Recently, swimming-style colour synaesthesia was introduced as a new form of synaesthesia. A synaesthetic Stroop test was used to establish its genuineness. Since Stroop interference can occur for any type of overlearned association, in the present study we used a modified Stroop test and psychophysiological synaesthetic conditioning to further establish the genuineness of this form of synaesthesia. We compared the performance of a swimming-style colour synaesthete and a control who was trained on swimming-style colour associations. Our results showed that behavioural aspects of swimming-style colour synaesthesia can be mimicked in a trained control. Importantly, however, our results showed a psychophysiological conditioning effect for the synaesthete only. We discuss the theoretical relevance of swimming-style colour synaesthesia according to different models of synaesthesia. We conclude that swimming-style colour synaesthesia is a genuine form of synaesthesia, can be mimicked behaviourally in non-synaesthetes, and is best explained by a re-entrant feedback model

Hacking the Brain: Dimensions of Cognitive Enhancement

In an increasingly complex information society, demands for cognitive functioning are growing steadily. In recent years, numerous strategies to augment brain function have been proposed. Evidence for their efficacy (or lack thereof) and side effects has prompted discussions about ethical, societal, and medical implications. In the public debate, cognitive enhancement is often seen as a monolithic phenomenon. On a closer look, however, cognitive enhancement turns out to be a multifaceted concept: There is not one cognitive enhancer that augments brain function per se, but a great variety of interventions that can be clustered into biochemical, physical, and behavioral enhancement strategies. These cognitive enhancers differ in their mode of action, the cognitive domain they target, the time scale they work on, their availability and side effects, and how they differentially affect different groups of subjects. Here we disentangle the dimensions of cognitive enhancement, review prominent examples of cognitive enhancers that differ across these dimensions, and thereby provide a framework for both theoretical discussions and empirical research